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NOTE
VARIABLE VERBALISTICS-THE MEASURE OF
PERSUASION IN TENNESSEE
[B]ut who are we that we should insist on certaintiesin a world of no
more at best than probabilities?
Learned Hand
The Bill of Rights
SCOPE AND BACKGROUND

In a trial one party always has the affirmative burden of persuading
the finder of fact to adopt his allegations as true. This burden is met
by inducing a particular degree of belief in the mind of the fact finder.'
Manifestly, absolute truth is not attainable in a lawsuit. Rather certain
facts are found to exist from all the evidence presented and these findings labeled true for the purposes of the case. Since different factual
situations require different measures of persuasion, it is necessary
that the fact finder, whether judge or jury, know and understand the
particular measure applicable in order to make a correct determination as to a fact in issue. If trial is by jury,2 it is the duty of the judge
1. '"Burden of persuasion" refers to the second element of the burden of
proof. The two elements are: (1) the risk of non-production of the evidence

and (2) the risk of non-persuasion of the jury. The former is more aptly
termed the burden of producing evidence, and presents a problem for the
judge. The burden of persuasion normally presents a jury question. See 1
MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS or EVIDmNCE 17-29 (1957). For general discussions
see also McComxcK, EVIDENCE §§ 306-22 (1954); 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2498a
(3d ed. 1940); Fisk, Burden of Proof, 1 U. CnT. L. REV. 257 (1927); Thayer, The
Burden of Proof, 4 HAv. L. REV. 45 (1890). See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 1, comments on paragraphs (2) and (3) (1942) and compare with UNiFomv RtLE oF EVIDENCE 1(4), comment subdivision 4 (1953).
Tennessee cases make a distinction between the primary and secondary sense
of burden of proof, terming the former as that burden which rests upon the
party against whom judgment would be rendered if no evidence were introduced; while the latter is deemed that burden to rebut the prima facie case
made out by the party bearing the primary burden. See Memphis Say. Bank
v. Union Bridge & Const. Co., 138 Tenn. 161, 196 S.W. 492 (1917); Woodward
v. Insurance Co., 104 Tenn. 49, 56 S.W. 1020 (1900); Jewett v. Graham, 62
Tenn. 16 (1873). See also CARUT RS, HISTORY OF A LAwsurT § 331 (7th ed.,
Gilreath 1951); Note, 10 VAM. L. REv. 563 (1957). A further distinction is
made between proof and evidence in that the former is the end whereas the
latter is the means by which this tends to be established. See GIBSON'S SUrTS
IN CHANCERY § 449 (5th ed., Crownover 1955).
2. In Tennessee, issues of fact are generally tried by the jury in both civil
and criminal cases. The jury in a civil case is bound by the law as given in
the charge. See TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 9. See also Haskins v. Howard, 159
Tenn. 86, 16 S.W.2d 20 (1928); Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 39 S.W. 341
(1897); M'Corry v. King's Heirs, 22 Tenn. (3 Humph.) 266 (1842); Finks v.
Gillum, 38 Tenn. App. 304, 273 S.W.2d 722 (M.S. 1954). However, in criminal
cases, the jury may determine the law for itself in disregard of the charge.
See TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 19. See also State v. Vincent, 147 Tenn. 458, 249
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to instruct to this end. The purpose of this note is to examine language
used in instructing as to the measure of persuasion or prescribed degree of belief as approved by Tennessee courts. The allocation of the
burden of proof or the effects of a presumption upon such burden are
not treated herein except to the extent necessary to determine their
effect upon the language used.3
Since jurors are not selected on the basis of their skill or experience
as fact finders, a charge should convey the proper standard for determining the requisite degree of belief in the most direct and succinct way possible.4 This, however, has seldom been the case. The
charge as to burden of persuasion has generally evolved into a ritualistic chant, both complicated and confusing. 5
The ordinary juror, when left to his own devices and without the
benefit of an understandable guide, will probably determine the issues
through an instinctive sense of right and wrong.6 It is not argued that
this necessarily produces unjust results, but it is contended that uniformity and predictability within the law can be better insured by
decisions rendered in adherence to a well defined legal guide rather
than by intuition. It seems feasible to surmise that a jury will make
an effort to adhere to the mandates of a charge when given in understandable terms capably expressing the expectations of the law. Concededly, words which are both adequately expressive and easily
S.W. 376 (1922); Powers v. State, 117 Tenn. 363, 97 S.W. 376 (1906); Ford v.

State, 101 Tenn. 454, 47 S.W. 703 (1898); Poole v. State, 61 Tenn. 288 (1872);
Nelson v. State, 32 Tenn. (2 Swan) 481 (1852); Dale v. State, 18 Tenn. 551

(1837); McGowan v. State, 17 Tenn. 184 (1836).

3. As to problems that arise due to the introduction of a presumption, see
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 306-22 (1954); 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 30-41 (1957); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2490-93 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Chargeson Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 5 N.C.L. REV. 291 (1927);
Morgan, Presumptions, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 512 (1956); Morgan, Instructing
the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REv. 59 (1933);
Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906
(1931); Annot., 103 A.L.R. 126 (1936). For an excellent note on presumptions
in Tennessee, see 10 VAND. L. REV. 563 (1957).
4. In McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242
(1944) it is stated that the chief fault in the present system is that the language
used to express the scope or extent of the burden of proof is not easily understood by the jury, which has the duty of deciding whether the burden has
been sustained.
5. Wigmore feels there are three basic faults in the charges as given today:
(1) the terms used are unsettled in meaning and ambiguous; (2) they tend
to so many logical and verbal discriminations that they are impractical and
unreal; and, (3) the jury in its brief moment of service cannot understand
the many legal refinements of the charge. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498 (2) (3d
ed. 1940). See also Morgan, Presumptions, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 512 (1956). In
Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE
L.J. 194 (1932), it is suggested that the only reason for the perpetuation of
the charge in its present form seems to be that trial judges realize that the
use of well-worn phrases will not usually be held erroneous by appellate
courts.
6. For an interesting discussion, see Curtis, Trial Judge and Jury, 5 VAND.
L. REV. 150 (1952).
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understood are not readily found. There are ambiguities in the simplest of words and the most expressive are often the most confusing.
However, realizing that the jury is completely untrained in the jargon
of the legal profession, the minimum goal in framing a charge should
be the use of words and phrases which give a sound statement of the
law and depict the required degree of belief in the clearest manner
7
possible.
Several Tennessee cases have recognized a need for clearness and
simplicity by indicating that an instruction must be within the comprehension of those uneducated in the law.8 However, the courts have
not always reflected this commendable attitude. Numerous cases hold
that if an instruction is substantially correct it is sufficient, although
not clear or explicit to the jury.9 On the other hand, a charge "calculated to mislead" has been deemed reversible in clear cases of
error.10 Despite this, it is generally stated that no matter how meager
or misleading, the charge will not cause reversal absent a special
request in the trial court by the party adversely affected;" and, a
7. "The common law system at this stage of its long and useful life should
not be in an unsatisfactory state as to elementary questions. Can anyone,
who has carefully read the decisions, say that the law as to the degree of
belief required for fact finding in civil and criminal cases is in a satisfactory

condition? We should no longer regard these matters as problems which we

have not solved, although we may admit without apology that we have not
been able to reach a satisfactory solution of many difficult questions of law."
McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 244-45
(1944).
8. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nashville Trust Co., 178 Tenn. 437, 159
S.W.2d 81 (1942) (additions should not be made which will lengthen charge
without clarification); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Anderson, 134 Tenn. 666,
185 S.W. 677 (1915) (error to read one party's pleadings as charge); Good v.
State, 69 Tenn. 293 (1878) (jury should not be mystified by abstractions);
Glover v. Burke, 23 Tenn. App. 350, 133 S.W.2d 611 (M.S. 1938) (charge
should be plain and simple); Herstein v. Kemker, 19 Tenn. App. 681, 94
S.W.2d 76 (W.S. 1936) (charge must be plain and simple).
9. See e.g., Rose & Co. v. Snyder, 185 Tenn. 499, 206 S.W.2d 897 (1947);
Southern Oil Works v. Bickford, 82 Tenn. 651 (1885); Hills v. Goodyear, 72
Tenn. 233 (1880); Dunlap, Moncure & Co. v. Babb, 59 Tenn. 315 (1873); Porter
v. Campbell, 61 Tenn. 81 (1872); Trotter v. Watson, 25 Tenn. 509 (1846);
Dorrity v. Mann, 310 S.W.2d 191 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957); Burrow v. Lewis,
24 Tenn. App. 253, 142 S.W.2d 758 (E.S. 1940); Tinin v. Siner, 9 Tenn. App.
252 (M.S. 1928); Kenny Co. v. Williams, I Tenn. App. 134 (W.S. 1925).
10. Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524, 45 S.W. 781 (1898); East Tennessee,
Va. & Ga. R.R. v. Gurley, 80 Tenn. 46 (1883); Somers v. Mississippi & Tenn.
R.R., 75 Tenn. 201 (1881).
11. See e.g., McClard v. Reid, 190 Tenn. 337, 229 S.W.2d 509 (1950); Rose
& Co. v. Snyder, 185 Tenn. 499, 206 S.W.2d 897 (1947); National Life & Acc.
Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 179 Tenn. 29, 162 S.W.2d 501 (1941); Gentry v. Betty Lou
Bakeries, 171 Tenn. 20, 100 S.W.2d 230 (1936); Citizen's St. Ry. v. Burke, 98

Tenn. 650, 40 S.W. 1085 (1897); Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Poston, 94

Tenn. 696, 30 S.W. 1040 (1895); Maxwell v. Hill, 89 Tenn. 584, 14 S.W. 486
(1891). However, other cases state that if the error goes to the merits of
the case, the charge is reversible even without a special request. Louisville
& N. Ry. v. Martin, 113 Tenn. 266, 87 S.W. 418 (1904); Mariner v. Smith, 66
Tenn. 423 (1874); Weakley v. Pearce, 52 Tenn. 401 (1871); Dixon Stave &
Heading Co. v. Archer, 291 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956). See also TENN.
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clearly erroneous charge is still non-reversible error unless prejudicial to the party alleging error. 12 It can be seen that it is impossible
to predict what will be the reaction of the appellate court to an allegation that a particular charge is either erroneous or misleading.
It would seem that any charge which is inaccurate or unclear is
always calculated to mislead and therefore, prejudicial. On the other
hand, justice often requires affirmance of a verdict regardless of deficiencies in the charge. It is submitted that this is a dilemma which
could be resolved by the use of a simple and understandable charge
which would afford no basis for reversal on the grounds of unclearness, and which would aid the jury, lend predictability to the law and
restrain unwarranted appellate court interference with the facts as
found below.
Depending upon the issues involved, American courts generally recognize three different standards for determining when the burden of
persuasion is met.13 In the normal civil action, the jury is instructed
that the existence or non-existence of a fact must be determined by a
"preponderance of the evidence." This language is usually further
explained by adding that the convincing force of the evidence, not its
volume, is controlling. 4 In the exceptional civil case, where, as a matCODE ANN. §§ 27-116-17
ed., Gilreath 1951).

(1955); CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT

§ 407 (7th

12. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-116-17 (1955). See Burrow v. Lewis, 24 Tenn.
App. 253, 142 S.W.2d 758 (E.S. 1940); Grizzard & Cuzzort v. O'Neill 15 Tenn.
App. 395 (M.S. 1932); Stepp v. Black, 14 Tenn. App. 153 (M.S. 19315.
13. Situations requiring different degrees of persuasion arise in everyday
life. The need for varying degrees in lawsuits can best be analogized to such
situations. See Morgan, Presumptions, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 512 (1956).
However, the need for three different degrees of persuasion has not always
been recognized by the courts. Before the nineteenth century, there seem to
be no judicial references to varying standards of proof. Friedman, Standards
of Proof, 33

CAN.

B. REv. 665 (1955). It was recognized however that the trier

of fact should be required to have a much stronger degree of belief before
convicting in a criminal case; thus there came to be two standards of proofthe civil standard of preponderance of the evidence and the criminal standard
of beyond a reasonable doubt. For an interesting discussion of the historical development of beyond reasonable doubt see May, Some Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and CriminalCases, 10 Am. L. REv. 642 (1876). The next
step was the development of a third standard to apply to those civil actions
where experience had shown that a stronger degree of belief was needed as to
claims inherently subject to fabrication, lapse of memory or the flexibility of
conscience. This third standard as applied to civil actions has the effect of
raising "the threshold at which evidence becomes of sufficient probative
force to be submitted to the jury." Note, 60 HARv. L. R.v. 111, 116 (1946).
See also 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 859a (5th ed. 1941); Comment,
32 CALIF. L. REv. 74 (1944).
14. For some of the explanations by appellate courts, see Annot., 93 A.L.R.
155 (1934). Frequently to aid the jury, the metaphor of a pair of scales is
used and the evidence of one party is pictured as being placed in one pan
and that of his adversary in the other. The pan holding the evidence of
greater convincing force will, of course, tip the scales. Morgan feels that
this metaphor makes clear that the convincing force of the evidence preponderates, regardless of its volume, but feels that this is likely to convey the
erroneous idea that the party who has supplied evidence of greater convincing
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ter of policy derived from experience, it is desirable that a heavier
burden be imposed, the trier of fact is usually told that he must be
persuaded by "clear and convincing evidence." In criminal cases, the
fact finder is instructed to find "beyond a reasonable doubt." Do these
phrases prescribe the requisite degree of belief in the clearest manner
possible? 1
A charge should direct the attention of the trier of fact to his own
state of mind. That which emphasizes the evidence shifts the focus of
attention to the means of producing belief rather than to belief itself.16
"Preponderance of the evidence" and "clear and convincing evidence"
refer to evidence and not to the required state of mind. Besides producing confusion, these standards may also result in error. For example, some evidence preponderates over, and must be of greater convincing force than no evidence. But it does not necessarily follow that
the litigant who has produced some evidence and thus caused a hypothetical set of scales to tilt in his favor should prevail for he may not
have persuaded the trier of fact to the requisite degree of beliefY'
Yet, under the typical charge is not the trier of fact who faithfully
performs his duties obligated to find in accordance with the "preponderance of evidence," even though not persuaded? Assuming such
faithfulness, would not the "preponderating" party have prevailed
without carrying his burden of persuasion? Of course, as noted previously, under such a charge the jury is likely to ignore its duty and
achieve the correct result intuitively.
Assuming that these charges could, by explanatory phrases, be so
worded as to direct the jury properly, would this not be an involved
and circuitous method of seeking a correct result? The attention and
respect which a charge will receive seem directly proportional to its
brevity and simplicity. A charge which attempts to do more than
state the jury's task simply and lucidly will influence the jury in an
inverse ratio to the degree of complexity, and the principle that the
force has, by that fact alone, satisfied the burden of persuasion. Manifestly,
this does not logically follow. Morgan, Presumptions, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 512
(1956).
15. For an indication that they do not, see 11 U. Cnr. L. REv. 119, 191 (1937)
wherein a poll of former jurors as to which propositions of law were the
most difficult for them to understand tallied as follows: preponderance of
the evidence-232; proximate cause-203; reasonable doubt-136; negligence
110.
16. 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EvmENCE 17-29 (1957); McBaine, Burden

of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALiF. L. REV. 242 (1944); Morgan, Presumptions, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 512 (1956); Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon

Presumptionsand Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59 (1933); Trickett, Pre-

ponderance of Evidence and Reasonable Doubt, 10 THE FoRum, Dickinson
School of Law 76 (1906); Comment, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 74 (1944).

17. "It would be fatuous to affirm that a man ought to believe, even faintly,
everything the evidence for which is, in his opinion, stronger than the evidence against it." Trickett, Preponderance of Evidence and Reasonable
Doubt, 10 Tim FORUM, Dickinson School of Law 76 (1906).
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jury should and will respond to the charge is defeated. Would not the
correct result be better insured by a simple and direct charge to the
jury in the first instance? 18 Only the criminal charge properly places
the emphasis on the desired state of mind of the finder of fact. It
seems only when the phrase "beyond reasonable doubt" is subjected
to complex explanations that it presents difficulties.
THE TENNESSEE

CASES

The Normal Civil Case
Innumerable Tennessee cases have established the rule that in
the normal civil action the burden of persuasion is satisfied by a
"preponderance of the evidence."' 9 Generally, it is said that this
refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregated testimony
21
or evidence on either side,20 or to the greater weight of evidence.
"Prepoiiderance" does not mean a mere numerical superiority of
witnesses.22 Its meaning has often been illustrated by analogy
to a pair of scales with the explanation that when more evidence is
placed in one pan so as to tip the scale in that direction, a preponderance has been satisfied.2 3 One opinion has stated that the term is so
plain that an attempt to explain it is apt to lead to confusion, and
that "the most common as well as the most critical mind can equally
understand." 24 This certainly overestimates the capabilities of the
most common, if not the most critical, mind 25 but correctly shows that
attempts at explanation do lead to confusion. This difficulty, however,
18. Such a result would not be achieved by use of language found in the
UNIFORM RuLEs OF EVIDENCE. Although intended to be remedial, one of the
chief faults of these rules is the failure to define the phraseology advocated
in readily understandable

(1953) with

terms.

MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE

Compare UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE

rule 1 (1942).

1

19. Law v. Louisville & N. R.R., 179 Tenn. 687, 170 S.W.2d 360 (1943);
Pierce v. Pierce, 174 Tenn. 508, 127 S.W.2d 791 (1939); Knights of Pythias v.
Steele, 107 Tenn. 1, 63 S.W. 1126 (1901); Gage v. Louisville, N.O. & T. R.R.,
88 Tenn. 724, 14 S.W. 73 (1890); Phillips v. Newport, 28 Tenn. App. 187, 187
S.W.2d 975 (M.S. 1945).
20. See e.g., Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524, 45 S.W. 781 (1898); Hills v.
Goodyear, 72 Tenn. 233 (1880).
21. See National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 159 Tenn. 130, 17 S.W.2d
13 (1928); Benson v. Fowler, 306 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957); Frumin
v. May, 36 Tenn. App. 32, 251 S.W.2d 314 (E.S. 1952); Ray v. Nanney, 21 Tenn.
App. 618, 114 S.W.2d 51 (W.S. 1937).
22. Robertson v. State, 189 Tenn. 42, 221 S.W.2d 535 (1949); Christian v.
State, 184 Tenn. 163, 197 S.W.2d 797 (1946); Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524,
45 S.W. 781 (1898); Ray v. Nanney, 21 Tenn. App. 618, 114 S.W.2d 51 (W.S.
1937). But note that in the Wilcox case, supra, it was noted that the number
of witnesses might be determinative.
23. See e.g., Pickard v. Berryman, 24 Tenn. App. 263, 142 S.W.2d 764 (W.S.
1939); Grizzard & Cuzzort v. O'Neill, 15 Tenn. App. 395 (M.S. 1932). But see
note 14, supra.
24. Knights of Pythias v. Steele, 108 Tenn. 624, 631, 69 S.W. 336, 337 (1902).
25. See note 15, supra.
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is inherent in the phrase itself and the proper solution- would seem tO
be a change in wording rather than attempts at explanation.
Dissatisfaction is reflected in the number of cases which, while
nominally accepting this charge as depicting the correct measure of
persuasion in the normal civil case, have modified, qualified, and added
to it in attempts to further explain its meaning. An early Tennessee
case, Chapman v. McAdams, 6 stated that any "slight preponderance"
of evidence was sufficient. Not only does this wrongly focus attention
on the evidence rather than the juror's mind, but it also requires a
juror to find that a fact exists even though no belief whatsoever is
generated as to the probable existence of such fact. Though the Chapman rule has been subjected to various interpretations,2 7 it would
appear that the use of the term "slight preponderance" is still permissible in Tennessee.2
Tennessee courts frequently use words which tend to call for a
higher degree of certainty than is usually considered necessary in the
normal civil case. For example, it is often said that to carry the burden
of persuasion, it is necessary to "satisfy" the jury of the existence or
non-existence of the facts in issue. Though "satisfy" is an ambiguous
word, subject to varying connotations, it seems in many instances to
impress upon the mind a requirement for more certainty than a "preponderance of evidence. '29 The Tennessee holdings as to the use of
"satisfy" or derivatives thereof are inconsistent. Such phraseology
has many times been approved, 30 but a leading case, Knights of
26. 69 Tenn. 500 (1878).
27. The fallacies of the Chapman "slight preponderance" rule were first

pointed out in the dissent of McFarland J., 69 Tenn. at 506. Still it was
followed in Hills v. Goodyear, 72 Tenn. 233 (1880) but rejected in Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Dungey, 128 Tenn. 587, 163 S.W. 802 (1913)
with a statement that McFarland's dissent was far more meritorious and
in fact had been subsequently followed by all Tennessee courts. However, the Dungey case itself was repudiated in Blount County v. Perry, 7
Tenn. App. 340 (E.S. 1928), the court stating that a mere or slight preponderance had been held sufficient in practically every case. The Perry view was
reinforced by Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Union Ry., 8 Tenn. App. 494 (W.S.
1928).
28. GiBsoN's SUITs IN CHANCERY § 453 (5th ed., Crownover 1955).
29. See 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 2 (16th ed. 1899) (satisfactory evidence

equivalent to beyond reasonable doubt). For discussion of judicial treatment

of "satisfaction" or derivatives thereof in civil charges, see Annot., 147 A.L.R.

380 (1943).

30. Gage v. Louisville, N.O. & T. R.R., 88 Tenn. 724, 14 S.W. 73 (1890); Hills
v. Goodyear, 72 Tenn. 233 (1880); Chapman v. McAdams, 69 Tenn. 500 (1878);
Ridley's Adm'rs v. Ridley, 41 Tenn. 323 (1860); Hamilton v. Zimmerman,

37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39 (1857); Gifford v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 16 Tenn.
App. 21, 64 S.W.2d 64 (M.S. 1932); Harriman & N. R.R. v. McCartt, 15 Tenn.
App. 109 (E.S. 1932); Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Harrison, 5 Tenn. App. 22
(M.S. 1927). That this is especially so when so qualified as to make clear
to the jury that the use of "satisfaction" or derivatives thereof does not

require certainty beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, see Jones v.

Mercer Pie Co., 187 Tenn. 322, 21,4 S.W.2d 46 (1948) (satisfy by a fair preponderance); Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124, 83 S.W.2d
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Pythias v. Steele, denounced its use and that of other carelessly drawn
phrases in the following language:
The true statement of the rule is that if the evidence preponderate in
favor of any contention of the plaintiff or defendant, that contention
may by the jury be considered as sufficiently sustained to rest a verdict
upon, and it is not necessary that the evidence should go so far as to
make said contention clear and plain or establish it in a sense to make
it free from doubt or uncertainty or set the minds of the jury at rest and
convince them absolutely of the truth of the contention. After all the
evidence that can be produced is introduced, the jury may still be unsatisfied-not convinced, their minds may not be at rest, they may not be
freed from doubt, uncertainty and suspense, but still the jury may recognize that there is a preponderance of evidence, and on that they may base
their verdict. 31

This statement indicates that the use of words such as "satisfy" in the
charge erroneously tends to call for an unnecessarily high degree of
certainty. Some subsequent cases have indicated that if such phrases
are properly qualified they will not be held erroneous, 2 while others
have adhered more closely to Knights of Pythias and have held that
the use of "satisfaction" is erroneous even though qualified.3 Not only
do qualifications tend to detract from the basic clearness and simplicity
that a charge must have if it is to be of any value to the jury, but it is
also felt that they cannot achieve their intended purpose of negating
the higher degree of certainty invoked by the use of "satisfy."
If use of the word "satisfy" imposes too great a burden, then a requirement that a party be "convinced" should be equally erroneous.
Although at one time approved,4 this expression is now generally
rejected in Tennessee.3 5

"Establish" means to make settled, definite or firm. To require that
a fact be established in the minds of the jury before finding it to exist,
would also seem to require a higher degree of belief than is normal in
civil cases. Though approved by an early Tennessee case,36 this view
was subsequently rejected as requiring the jury to be satisfied of the
251 (1935) (satisfy by a preponderance of the evidence); Burrow v. Lewis,
24 Tenn. App. 253, 142 S.W.2d 758 (E.S. 1940) (satisfy by a preponderance);

Standard Oil Co. v. Roach, 19 Tenn. App. 661, 94 S.W.2d 63 (M.S. 1935)

(satisfy by a fair preponderance).
31. 107 Tenn. 1, 10, 63 S.W. 1126, 1128 (1901).
32. Gifford v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 16 Tenn. App. 21, 64 S.W.2d 64 (M.S.
1932); Harriman & N. R.R. v. McCartt, 15 Tenn. App. 109 (E.S. 1932).
33. Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Dungey, 128 Tenn. 587, 163 S.W. 802 (1913);
Fisher v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 124 Tenn. 450, 138 S.W. 316 (1911); Stepp v.
Black, 14 Tenn. App. 153 (M.S. 1931).
34. Ridley's Adm'rs v. Ridley, 41 Tenn. 323 (1860).
35. See e.g., Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85
(1939); Knights of Pythias v. Steele, 107 Tenn. 1, 63 S.W. 1126 (1901); McBee
v. Bowman, 89 Tenn. 136, 14 S.W. 481 (1890).
36. Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 38 (1857).
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truth of the fact. 37 However, the rule today seems to be that although
the use of "establish" is abstractly improper, it is not reversible error
if it is non-prejudicial or sufficiently qualified to show that only the
normal civil standard is required. 38
Sometimes the charge is so phrased as to indicate that the facts must
be found to be true before a party will be entitled to a verdict. Since
the aim of a lawsuit can never be the determination of absolute truth,
such charges require an impossible measure of persuasion. For the
most part, the Knights of Pythias view which treats such a charge as
erroneous is accepted in Tennessee.39
A requirement that the facts be made "plain" or "clear and plain"
to the juror's mind, or that the mind be made "free from doubt," also
calls for more certainty than normally required, and has generally
been recognized as erroneous in Tennessee.40 However, two cases have
indicated that it is not erroneous to require that a fact be "substantially proved. 4 1 Several have added the qualification that the fact must
be proved by a "fair preponderance."4 2 This is a useless qualification
of an already confusing term, for just what is a fair preponderance?
The Tennessee opinions have been inconsistent as to the measure of
persuasion required when circumstantial evidence is introduced. Several have indicated that in such cases more than the normal preponderance is required, and many have imposed standards equivalent
to "beyond reasonable doubt." It has been stated that the circumstances must be such as usually or necessarily attend the essential facts. 43 Other opinions have maintained that a theory cannot be
37. Knights of Pythias v. Steele, 107 Tenn. 1, 63 S.W. 1126 (1901).
38. See Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenin. 124, 83 S.W.2d
251 (1935); Fisher v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 1241 Tenn. 450, 138 S.W. 316 (1911);
Grizzard & Cuzzort v. O'Neill, 15 Tenn. App. 395 (M.S. 1932); Stepp v. Black,
14 Tenn. App. 153 (M.S. 1931); Gannon v. Crichlow, 13 Tenn. App. 281 (M.S.

1931). But see Ballinger v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 Tenn. 367, 69
S.W.2d 1090 (1934); Gifford v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 16 Tenn. App. 21, 64
S.W.2d 64 (M.S. 1932).
39. See e.g., Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Dungey, 128 Tenn. 587, 163 S.W.
802 (1913); Nashville Bridge Co. v. Hudgins, 23 Tenn. App. 677, 137 S.W.2d

327 (M.S. 1938). But see Stepp v. Black, 14 Tenn. App. 153 (M.S. 1931); East
End Tire & Oil Co. v. Mallory, 2 Tenn. App. 101 (W.S. 1925); Kenny Co. v.
Williams, 1 Tenn. App. 134 (W.S. 1925).

40. See Knights of Pythias v. Steele, 107 Tenn. 1, 63 S.W. 1126 (1901).
41. Nashville Ry. &Light Co. v. Dungey, 128 Tenn. 587, 163 S.W. 802 (1913);
Glover v. Burke, 23 Tenn. App. 350, 133 S.W.2d 611 (M.S. 1939).
42. Jones v. Mercer Pie Co., 187 Tenn. 322, 214 S.W.2d 46 (1948); Standard
Oil Co. v. Roach, 19 Tenn. App. 661, 94 S.W.2d 63 (M.S. 1935); Gannon v.
Crichlow, 13 Tenn. App. 281 (M.S. 1931); Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Harrison, 5 Tenn. App. 22 (M.S. 1927).
43. See Marquet v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 Tenn. 213, 159 S.W. 733 (1913);
Dunlap v. State, 126 Tenn. 450, 150 S.W. 86 (1912). In spite of later developments indicating that this phrase might not be adequate, it has recurred in
recent decisions. See Malone v. Robinson, 35 Tenn. App. 320, 245 S.W.2d 628
(M.S. 1951); Yearwood v. Louisville & N. R.R., 32 Tenn. App. 115, 222 S.W.2d

33 (M.S. 1949); Havron v. Sequachee Valley Elec. Co-Op, 30 Tenn. App. 234,

204 S.W.2d 823 (en banc 1947).
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made out by circumstantial evidence unless the facts are consistent
with such theory and absolutely inconsistent with any other rational
theory;44 or that the circumstantial evidence must so preponderate
as to exclude "with reasonable certainty" other hypotheses, 45 or "every
other reasonable hypothesis." 46 Other phrases have been used which
also seem to have the effect of requiring more than a preponderance
of the evidence where circumstantial evidence is involved.47 However,
in the case of Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,48 the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, in addressing itself to this problem, stated:
The general rule is that it is sufficient in a civil case depending on
circumstantial evidence, for the party having the burden of proof to
make out the more probable hypothesis and the evidence need not arise
to that degree of certainty which will exclude every other reasonable
conclusion. 49
The Bryan case has been generally cited in cases involving circumstantial evidence, but subsequent opinions generally substitute the
phrase "preponderance of the evidence" for "more probable hypothesis."50

It is submitted that since use of the phrase "preponderance of the
evidence" as depicting the measure of persuasion in the normal civil
case places emphasis on the means of persuasion rather than on the
effect of that persuasion on the mind of the finder of fact, and since the
imposition of qualifications or modifications to this phrase tends only
to confuse and mislead, this language should be replaced by more
understandable terms. Further, there should be no distinction as to
44. Meador v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 177 Tenn. 273, 148 S.W.2d 371
(1941); Standard Oil Co. v. Roach, 19 Tenn. App. 661, 94 S.W.2d 63 (M.S.
1935); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Van Dodson, 14 Tenn. App. 54 (M.S.
1931); Crowe v. Birmingham & N.W. Ry., 2 Tenn. App. 634 (W.S. 1925).
45. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 6 Tenn. App. 43 (M.S. 1927);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Staples, 5 Tenn. App. 436 (E.S. 1927).
46. Gannon v. Crichlow, 13 Tenn. App. 281 (M.S. 1931).
47. See Ballinger v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 Tenn. 367, 69 S.W.2d
1090 (1934); Gifford v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 16 Tenn. App. 21, 64 S.W.2d
64 (M.S. 1932) (satisfy reasonable minds of the fact).
48. 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85 (1939).
49. Id. at 610, 130 S.W.2d at 88.

50. Law v. Louisville & N. R.R., 179 Tenn. 687, 170 S.W.2d 360 (1943); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Nashville Trust Co., 178 Tenn. 437, 159 S.W.2d 81 (1942);
Burkett v. Johnston, 39 Tenn. App. 276, 282 S.W.2d 647 (W.S. 1955); Noe v.
Talley, 38 Tenn. App. 342, 274 S.W.2d 367 (E.S. 1954); Kidd v. Tennessee Gas
Co., 33 Tenn. App. 302, 231 S.W.2d 793 (E.S. 1950); Yearwood v. Louisville
&N. R.R., 32 Tenn. App. 115, 222 S.W.2d 33 (M.S. 1949); McMahan v. Tucker,
31 Tenn. App. 429, 216 S.W.2d 356 (W.S. 1948); Good v. Tennessee Coach Co.,
30 Tenn. App. 575, 209 S.W.2d 41 (M.S. 1947); Everett v. Evans, 30 Tenn.
App. 450, 207 S.W.2d 350 (M.S. 1947); Johnson v. Ely, 30 Tenn. App. 294, 205

S.W.2d 759 (E.S. 1947); Havron v. Sequachee Valley Elec. Co-Op, 30 Tenn.
App. 234, 204 S.W.2d 823 (en banc 1947); Tennessee Central Ry. v. McCowan,

28 Tenn. App. 225, 188 S.W.2d 931 (M.S. 1945); Phillips v. Newport, 28 Tenn.
App. 187, 187 S.W.2d 965 (M.S. 1945); Pickard v. Berryman, 24 Tenn. App.
263, 142 S.W.2d 764 (W.S. 1939); Gulf Refining Co. v. Frazier, 19 Tenn. App.
76, 83 S.W.2d 285 (M.S. 1934).
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measure of persuasion whether the facts be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.
The Unusual Civil Case
In some civil cases a higher degree of belief is required before a
fact can be found to exist. This requirement is imposed in cases
where allegations of an unusual nature are introduced, such as charges
of fraud, crime, or moral dereliction; attempts to vary or change a
writing; or attempts to prove a lost instrument. In imposing this
higher standard the court usually states that there must be "clear and
convincing" evidence, or employs similar phraseology.
Whether the use of such language actually imposes a higher measure of persuasion and creates a middle ground between the normal
civil and criminal cases has been questioned. Some Tennessee cases
have stated that the phrase "clear and convincing" refers only to
quality of proof and not quantity; therefore no more than a preponderance of this particular quality of evidence would be needed to
sustain an allegation.5' Notwithstanding such interpretations it seems
obvious that the courts actually intend to require a higher degree of
persuasion when this language is used in the charge, and such language
would lead a trier of fact to feel that he must be persuaded to a higher
degree of belief before finding a fact to exist or not to exist.
Not only has there been great variance in the language used in imposing this higher measure of persuasion, but, in many instances there
has been disagreement as to whether a particular fact situation should
be within this middle ground. This is not totally unexpectable since
the dividing line between the normal and the exceptional civil case
is nebulous, resulting in a tendency to overlap at certain common
points. Also, some Tennessee opinions seem still to be influenced by
predilections to use the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt
in any civil case where allegations of crime are in issue.52 Tennessee
cases wherein this higher measure of persuasion has been imposed
will be analyzed as to the particular type of fact situation in which
they arose.
Insurer's Defense of Suicide to Action on a Life Policy: In Tennessee, there is a presumption against suicide which is treated as evidence.5 3 An insurer relying upon suicide as a defense must bear the
burden of persuasion.54 While some opinions have stated that this
51. See Ray v. Nanney, 21 Tenn. App. 618, 114 S.W.2d 51 (W.S. 1937).

52. See Groom, Proof of Crime in a Civil Proceeding, 13 M1i-.

L. REv. 556

(1929).

53. Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85 (1939);
Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124, 83 S.W.2d 251 (1935).
See Note, 10 VAND. L. REV. 563 (1957).
54. See Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124, 83 S.W.2d
251 (1953). While the court said that the defendant averring suicide had the
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burden is sustained only by clear and convincing evidence, or an even
higher measure of persuasion, 55 most Tennessee cases hold that it is
sustained by evidence which preponderates over the opposing evi56
dence, as reinforced by the presumption.
Despite the use of the phrase "preponderance," which generally connotes a normal civil action, the courts in this situation seem desirous
of imposing upon a party a greater burden of persuasion by virtue of
the imposition of the presumption. Since such a higher degree of
persuasion is required, this type of case seems to fall within the middle
ground, whether placed there by the imposition of the presumption or
the use of language normally associated therewith.
Proving a Lost Instrument: A measure of persuasion greater than
that of the normal civil case is required to prove a lost instrument in
57
order to avoid the potential danger arising from fraud and deception.
With several early exceptions 58 Tennessee opinions are uniform in
holding that the measure of persuasion in such cases must be greater
than in a normal civil case, but need not rise to that degree of certainty required for a criminal case. The language most often used to
impose this standard is that the proof must be "strong, clear, and convincing," but this is not uniform. 59
burden of proof only in the secondary sense, it further said that this burden
must be met by preponderance of the evidence, which clearly places the
burden of persuasion on the defendant. See also Nichols v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 178 Tenn. 209, 156 S.W.2d 436 (1941); Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174
Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85 (1939); Knights of Pythias v. Steele, 107 Tenn. 1,

63 S.W. 1126 (1901); Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n. v. Denton, 22 Tenn.

App. 495, 124 S.W.2d 278 (M.S. 1938); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Robertson,

6 Tenn. App. 43 (M.S. 1927); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Staples, 5 Tenn.
App. 436 (E.S. 1927); Brown v. Sun Life Ins. Co., 57 S.W. 415 (Tenn. Ch.

App. 1899).
55. Fisher v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 124 Tenn. 450, 138 S.W. 316 (1911) (use
of "establish" in charge unfortunate but not erroneous); Life & Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Robertson, 6 Tenn. App. 43 (M.S. 1927) (evidence must so preponderate
as to exclude with reasonable certainty any hypothesis of death by accident);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Staples, 5 Tenn. 436 (E.S. 1927) (exclude with
reasonable certainty any hypothesis of death by accident or act of another).
56. See cases cited in footnote 54, supra.
57. See McCarty v. Kyle, 44 Tenn. 348 (1867); Copeland v. Murphey, 42
Tenn. 64 (1865); Tisdale v. Tisdale, 34 Tenn. 596 (1855); Roysdon v. Terry,
4 Tenn. App. 638 (M.S. 1927); Johnson v. McKamey, 53 S.W. 221 (Tenn. Ch.
App. 1899).
58. See e.g., McCarty v. Kyle, 44 Tenn. 348 (1867) (reasonable certainty);
Tisdale v. Tisdale, 34 Tenn. 596 (1855) (evidence must leave no reasonable
doubt).
59. See Hunter v. Gardenhire, 81 Tenn. 658 (1884) (clearest and most
stringent evidence or satisfactory proof); Morris v. Swaney, 54 Tenn. 591
(1872) (clearly and fully satisfied); Lamons v. Mathes, 33 Tenn. App. 609,
232 S.W.2d 558 (E.S. 1950) (clear and convincing evidence); Haven v.
Wrinkle, 29 Tenn. App. 195, 195 S.W.2d 787 (1945); Hammer v. American
United Life Ins. Co., 24 Tenn. App. 119, 141 S.W.2d 501 (E.S. 1940); Roysdon
v. Terry, 4 Tenn. App. 638 (M.S. 1927) (strong, clear, cogent and conclusive
evidence); Wolfe v. Williams, 1 Tenn. App. 441 (W.S. 1925) (clear, cogent
and convincing evidence); Asbury v. Hannum, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. 146 (1917)
(clear and satisfactory evidence); Johnson v. McKamey, 53 S.W. 221 (Tenn.
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Establishing Title by Adverse Possession: To establish title by adverse possession in Tennessee, the party bearing the burden of persuasion must induce a higher degree of belief in the mind of the
finder of fact. It is said in such cases that the evidence must be "clear
62
61
and positive, '60 "strong, clear and positive," "entirely satisfactory,"
63
'64
"ample, clear and convincing" or merely "clear and convincing.
Establishing a Gift Causa Mortis or Inter Vivos Against the Estate
of a Deceased Donor:
Gifts inter vivos, as well as gifts casua mortis, ought not to be sustained
unless the evidence clearly and fully establishes every fact necessary
to constitute a valid and completed gift. This is proper to the end that
the rights of creditors may not be obstructed, that the donor may not
be induced to the action involved in the gift by fraud or undue influence,
and the result produced be an inequitable or unjust distribution of his
estate, and that his weakness of body or mind may not be imposed on.
In short, this class of gifts ... are closely watched by courts, and they
will not be sustained except upon clear and convincing evidence.

This excerpt from Royston v. McCulley65 states the basic policy reason
for imposing a higher measure of persuasion in such cases.
As to claims of gifts inter vivos, the majority of Tennessee cases
have followed the rule of Sheegog v. Perkins in holding that the gift
must be proved "absolutely and beyond a doubt .... [Every] doubt
must prevail against the hypothesis of the gift. '66 Conceding that
some higher standard is required, it is manifestly erroneous to impose
a requirement of belief even greater than beyond reasonable doubt.
67
Other cases have been less demanding.
Ch. App. 1899) (very clear and cogent evidence). See generally, Annots., 41
A.L.R.2d 393 (1955); 3 A.L.R.2d 949 (1949); 148 A.L.R. 400 (1944); 126 A.L.R.
1139 (1940).
60. Drewery v. Neims, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S.W. 946 (1915); Harrison v.
Beatty, 24 Tenn. App. 13, 137 S.W.2d 946 (M.S. 1939); Mathis v. Campbell,
22 Tenn. App. 40, 117 S.W.2d 764 (M.S. 1938); Westmoreland v. Farmer, 7
Tenn. App. 385 (M.S. 1928); Beatty v. Owens, 6 Tenn. App. 154 (M.S. 1927);

Zuccarello v. Erwin, 2 Tenn. App. 491 (M.S. 1926).

61. Coal & Iron Co. v. Coppinger, 95 Tenn. (11 Pick.) 526, 32 S.W. 465
(1895).
62. Mercy v. Miller, 25 Tenn. App. 621, 166 S.W.2d 628 (M.S. 1942).
63. Ibid.
64. Roysdon v. Terry, 4 Tenn. App. 638 (M.S. 1927).
65. 59 S.W. 725, 733 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900). See also Atchley v. Rimmer,
118 Tenn. 303, 255 S.W. 366 (1923).
66. 63 Tenn. 273, 281-82 (1874). See also Pamplin v. Satterfield, 196 Tenn.

297, 264 S.W.2d 886 (1953); Chandler v. Roddy, 163 Tenn. 338, 43 S.W.2d 397

(1931); Williams v. Thornton, 160 Tenn. 229, 22 S.W.2d 1041 (1930); Shugart
v. Shugart, 111 Tenn. 179, 76 S.W. 821 (1903); Balling v. Manhatten Say. Bank
& Trust, 110 Tenn. 288, 75 S.W. 1051 (1903); First Nat'l Bank v. Howard, 302
S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957); American Nat'l Bank v. Robinson, 27
Tenn. App. 644, 184 S.W.2d 393 (M.S. 1944); O'Brien v. Waggoner, 20 Tenn.
App. 145, 96 S.W.2d 170 (M.S. 1936); Ferry v. Bryant, 19 Tenn. App. 612, 93

S.W.2d 344 (E.S. 1935).
67. See Atchley v. Rimmer, 148 Tenn. 303, 255 S.W. 366 (1923) (ample, clear
and convincing); Mercy v. Miller, 25 Tenn. App. 621, 166 S.W.2d 628 (M.S.
1942) (ample, clear and convincing); Nashville Trust Co. v. Williams, 15
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Gifts causa mortis also require this greater measure of persuasion,
although often expressed in language decidedly different. Most cases
state that the proof must be clear and convincing 8 with some using
the phrase, "clear, convincing and unequivocal." 69
Allegations of Incapacity or Undue Influence in an Issue of Devisavit
Vel Non: Early Tennessee cases indicated that to sustain an allegation
of incapacity, mental or physical, or a charge of undue influence on an
issue of devisavit vel non; or, to establish a nuncupative will, more
than the normal civil measure of persuasion was required. "Clearest
and most satisfactory proof," 70 "satisfactory evidence,"7' "full and
73
satisfactory evidence,"7 2 "clear, cogent and convincing evidence" these phrases are typical of the language used to express the burden
imposed.7 4
75
The landmark case-of Pierce v. Pierce
determined that an allegation of insanity in an issue of devisavit vel non need not be sustained
by the clearest and most satisfactory proof but that a preponderance
of the evidence was sufficient if it overcame the opposing evidence
when coupled with the presumption of sanity. This case has been
generally followed.7 6 Although it speaks in terms of "preponderance
Tenn. App. 445 (M.S. 1932) (full, clear and convincing); Lenow v. Bank of

Commerce & Trust Co., 4 Tenn. App. 218 (W.S. 1927) (clear, cogent and
convincing); Hesse v. Hamberger, 39 S.W. 1063 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1896) (full
and satisfactory proof).
68. Wilson v. Wilson, 151 Tenn. 486, 267 S.W. 364 (1924); Scott v. Union &
Planter's Bank & Trust Co., 123 Tenn. 258, 130 S.W. 757 (1910); McAdoo v.
Dickson, 23 Tenn. App. 74, 126 S.W.2d 393 (W.S. 1938); Royston v. McCulley,
59 S.W. 725 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900).
69. See e.g., Gambill v. Hogan, 30 Tenn. App. 465, 207 S.W.2d 356 (E.S.
1947).
70. Porter v. Campbell, 61 Tenn. 81 (1872) (insanity); Gass' Heirs v. Gass'
Ex'rs, 22 Tenn. 278 (1842) (insanity); Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v.
Stavros, 20 Tenn. App. 662, 103 S.W.2d 593 (W.S. 1936) (mental incapacity);
Hager v. Hager, 13 Tenn. App. 23 (M.S. 1930) (undue influence and mental
incapacity).
71. Maxwell v. Hill, 89 Tenn. 584, 15 S.W. 253 (1891) (illiteracy); Key v.
Holloway, 66 Tenn. 575 (1874) (insanity); Watterson v. Watterson, 38 Tenn.
1 (1858) (illiteracy); Ford v. Ford, 26 Tenn. 92 (1846) (insanity); Miller v.
Ford, 1 Tenn. App. 618 (E.S. 1925) (nuncupative will).
72. Wisener & Brown v. Maupin, 61 Tenn. 342 (1872) (illiteracy); Smith v.
Thurman, 49 Tenn. 110 (1870) (nuncupative will); Crafton v. Harris, 9 Tenn.
App. 561 (M.S. 1929) (physical incapacity).
73. Ray v. Nanney, 21 Tenn. App. 618, 114 S.W.2d 51 (W.S. 1937) (nuncupative will).
74. One oft-cited case stated that the measure in such cases should be
whatever was sufficient to convince the mind of an intellingent and unbiased
jury of the truth of the fact. Cox v. Cox, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 81 (1853). See
also Murray v. Garrison, 306 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956). Other
cases have made no reference whatever to the measure of persuasion. See
Puryear v. Reese, 46 Tenn. 21 (1868); Pettitt's Ex'rs v. Pettitt, 23 Tenn. (4
Humph.) 190 (1843).
75. 174 Tenn. 508, 127 S.W.2d 791 (1939).
76. See Halle v. Summerfield, 199 Tenn. 445, 287 S.W.2d 57 (1955); Hammond v. Union Planter's Nat'l Bank, 189 Tenn. 93, 222 S.W.2d 377 (1949);
Jones v. Sands, 292 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953); Cude v. Culbertson,
30 Tenn. App. 628, 209 S.W.2d 506 (W.S. 1947).
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of the evidence," Pierce can still be said to be within the middle
ground, as were the suicide-insurer cases noted previously, for, by'
invoking a presumption of sanity or competency a burden of persuading the finder of fact to a higher degree of belief is placed upon the
7
party alleging incompetency.
Establishing a ParolTrust or a Resulting Trust: The judicial desire

to protect the sanctity of written instruments from parol attack has
resulted in a requirement of a higher measure of persuasion to establish a parol trust or a resulting trust. It has been stated that to
establish a trust by parol evidence, the trust must be "clearly proved"
or "clearly established, 7 8s "proved with certainty,"7 9 "proved beyond
reasonable doubt,"80 or established by 8 evidence which is "clear,"
"cogent," "convincing," or "irrefragable." '
The language expressing the measure of persuasion necessary to
establish a resulting trust is somewhat similar and just as stringent.82
Reforming or Setting Aside a Written Instrument: The desire to

protect the sanctity of written instruments becomes even more apparent when one litigant seeks to reform or set aside such an instrument. Although some cases have indicated that the burden of per77. See generally Morgan, Burden of Proof and Presumptions in Will Con-

tests in Tennessee, 5 VAND. L. REV. 74 (1951).
78. Brunson v. Gladish, 174 Tenn. 309, 125 S.W.2d 144 (1938); Harris v.
Union Bank, 41 Tenn. 152 (1860); Pritchard v. Wallace, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed)
405 (1857).
79. Hardison v. Billingston, 82 Tenn. 346 (1884).
80. Guntert v. Guntert, 37 S.W. 890 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1896).
81. Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Tenn. 1, 80 S.W.2d 666 (1934) (clear and convincing);
Stone v. Manning, 103 Tenn. 232, 52 S.W. 990 (1899) (clear, cogent and
convincing); Seaton v. Dye, 37 Tenn. App. 323, 263 S.W.2d 544 (E.S. 1953)
(clear, cogent, convincing and irrefragable); Hoffner v. Hoffner, 32 Tenn.
App. 98, 221 S.W.2d 907 (E.S. 1949) (clear, cogent and convincing); Pearson
v. McCallum, 26 Tenn. App. 413, 173 S.W.2d 150 (W.S. 1941) (clear, cogent
and convincing); Savage v. Savage, 4 Tenn. App. 277 (M.S. 1927) (clear,
cogent and convincing).
82. Clear and satisfactory: Gaugh v. Henderson, 39 Tenn. 628 (1859); Haywood v. Ensley, 27 Tenn. 460 (1847); Shoun v. Gentry, 2 Tenn. App. 55 (E.S.
1925). Clearest and most convincing: Pheonix F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Shoemaker,
95 Tenn. 72, 31 S.W. 370 (1895); Allen v. Goldstein, 291 S.W.2d 596 (Tenn.
App. W.S. 1956); Caprum v. Bransford Realty Co., 4 Tenn. App. 237 (M.S.
1927). Clearly established or clearly shown: Dudley v. Bosworth, 29 Tenn.
9 (1848); Devisees & Ex'rs of Robertson v. Maclin, 4 Tenn. (3 Hay.) 70 (1816).
Clear and convincing evidence: Nashville Trust Co. v. Lannom's Heirs, 36
S.W. 977 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1896). Clear and unequivocal evidence: Greenwood
v. Maxey, 190 Tenn. 599, 231 S.W.2d 315 (1950); Shoemaker v. Smith, 30 Tenn.
(11 Humph.) 81 (1850); Greene v. Greene, 38 Tenn. App. 238, 272 S.W.2d 483
(M.S. 1954). Most convincing and irrefragable evidence: Hyden v. Hyden, 65
Tenn. 406 (1873); Holder v. Nunnelly, 42 Tenn. 288 (1865); McCammon v.
Pettitt, 35 Tenn. (3 Sneed) 242 (1855); Burnett v. Campbell County, 1 Tenn.
Ch. App. 18 (1901). Proved clearly and satisfactorily: Sandford v. Weeden,
49 Tenn. 71 (1870). Clear, convincing and irrefragable evidence: Hall v.
Fowlkes, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) 745 (1872). Most satisfactory and convincing
evidence: Pillow v. Thomas, 60 Tenn. 120 (1873). Shown with great clearness
and certainty: Sullivan v. Sullivan, 86 Tenn. 376, 65 S.W. 876 (1888); Wells
v. Stratton, 1 Tenn. Ch. 328 (1873). Established beyond doubt: Walker v.
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suasion is met by a preponderance of the evidence, an examination
of these opinions shows that they refer to a preponderance over the
opposing evidence as reinforced by a presumption in favor of the
written instrument. 83 As has been noted this is but a circuitous means
of requiring a higher degree of belief. To show that a deed absolute on
its face is intended as a mortgage, it is generally stated that the evidence must be "clear, decisive and without doubt," 4 "exceedingly
clear and satisfactory, '85 "cogent and clear,"8 6 or "clearly established
beyond reasonable controversy. '87 To reform or set aside a written
contract or deed, the Tennessee cases have used language substantially
similar to that above in describing the degree of belief.88
Allegations of Fraud,Crime or Moral Dereliction:At one time there
was much judicial disagreement as to the measure of persuasion necesWalker, 2 Tenn. App. 279 (M.S. 1925). Clear, cogent and convincing evidence:
Warner v. Maroney, 16 Tenn. App. 78, 66 S.W.2d 244 (E.S. 1932); TennesseeCarolina Mills v. Mauk, 14 Tenn. App. 517 (E.S. 1931).
83. See Stone v. Manning, 103 Tenn. 232, 234-35, 52 S.W. 990 (1899) Bennett v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 107 Tenn. 371, 64 S.W. 759 1901).

84. Lewis v. Bayliss, 90 Tenn. 280, 16 S.W. 376 (1891) (no reasonable doubt);
Lane v. Dickerson, 18 Tenn. 373 (1837).
85. Loyd v. Currin, 22 Tenn. 462 (1842).
86. Haynes v. Swann, 53 Tenn. 560 (1871); Nickson v. Toney, 40 Tenn.
(3 Head) 655 (1859).
87. Battle v. Claiborne, 133 Tenn. 286, 180 S.W. 584 (1915).
88. Clear and strong, to the entire satisfaction of the court: Perry v. Pearson,
20 Tenn. (1 Humph.) 431 (1839). Clear, certain and satisfactory: Johnson v.
Johnson, 67 Tenn. 261 (1874); Bailey v. Bailey, 27 Tenn. 230 (1847); Sands v.
Hickman, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. 280 (1912). Entirely clear and satisfactory:
Alexander v. Shapard, 146 Tenn. 90, 240 S.W. 287 (1921); Talley v. Courtney,
48 Tenn. 715 (1870); Cromwell v. Winchester, 39 Tenn. 389 (1859); Barnes v.
Gregory, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 230 (1858); Davidson v. Greer, 35 Tenn. (3 Sneed)
383 (1855); First Nat'l Bank v. Ashby, 2 Tenn. App. 666 (M.S. 1925); Townsend v. Cocke, 1 Shan. Tenn. Cas. 95 (1858). Beyond reasonable controversy:
Cromwell v. Winchester, 39 Tenn. 389 (1859); Davidson v. Greer, 35 Tenn.
(3 Sneed) 383 (1855); Myrick v. Johnson, 25 Tenn. App. 483, 160 S.W.2d 185
(M.S. 1941); Mayberry v. Nichol, 39 S.W. 881 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1896). Clearest
and most satisfactory proof: Wry v. Cutler, 59 Tenn. 28 (1873). Full and
satisfactory proof: McClelland v. Payne, 84 Tenn. 709 (1886). Clear, exact,
satisfactory and conclusive: Rodgers v. Smith, 48 S.W. 700 (Tenn. Ch. App.
1898). Clear, satisfactory, convincing and conclusive: Kyle v. Kyle, 18 Tenn.
App. 200, 74 S.W.2d 1065 (E.S. 1934). Clearest and most convincing: Kennedy
v. Security Bldg. & Say. Ass'n., 57 S.W. 388 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900). Practically

beyond reasonable doubt: Clack v. Hadley, 64 S.W. 403 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1901).

Clear and unmistakable: Cauchron v. Stirespring, 132 Tenn. 636, 179 S.W.

152 (1915). Clearly proven: Young v. Weakley, 144 Tenn. 360, 232 S.W. 949
(1920).

Clear and convincing: Hazzlett v. Bryant, 192 Tenn. 251, 241 S.W.2d

121 (1950); Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110 (1924); Commercial

Standard Ins. Co. v. Paul, 35 Tenn. App. 394, 245 S.W.2d 775 (E.S. 1951);
Napier v. Stone, 21 Tenn. App. 626, 114 S.W.2d 57 (M.S. 1937). Clear, strong,
unequivocal, unmistakable and beyond a doubt: Walker v. Walker, 2 Tenn.
App. 279 (M.S. 1925). Clear, cogent, convincing and irrefragable: Anderson
v. Howard, 18 Tenn. App. 169, 74 S.W.2d 387 (E.S. 1934); City of Lawrenceburg v. Maryland Cas. Co., 16 Tenn. App. 238, 64 S.W.2d 69 (M.S. 1933).
Clearly made out: Henderson v. Henderson, 159 Tenn. 126, 17 S.W.2d 15

(1928). Clearly established: Greer v. Ferguson Grocery Co., 168 Tenn. 242,
77 S.W.2d 443 (1935). Established beyond controversy: Wry v. Cutler, 59
Tenn. 28 (1873). Clear, cogent and convincing: Marron v. Scarbrough, 314
S.W.2d 165 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).
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sary to sustain an allegation of crime, fraud or moral dereliction in a
civil proceeding. This arose from the fear that allowing allegations
essentially criminal in nature to be proved by the normal civil measure
would deprive defendant of criminal procedural safeguards. The
earlier English rule required that the criminal standard be applied in
such cases.3 9 However, the great majority of American jurisdictions
now hold that such allegations do not have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.9 0
Coulter v. Stuart,9 ' an 1828 Tennessee case involving an allegation
of perjury in a civil action of slander, indicated by way of dictum that
the quantum of proof necessary to sustain such a charge was the same
as that necessary in a criminal action. Subsequent cases92 recognizing
the Coulter dictum to be an exception to the general rule held that
only a preponderance of the evidence was needed, but it must be such
as to outweigh the opposing evidence plus the presumption of innocence. 93 Lay v. LinkeM removed any doubt as to the effect of Coulter
by pointing out that the criminal standard was not required in Tennessee civil cases and that only a preponderance is necessary. In
McBee v. Bowman, the Supreme Court of Tennessee explained the
rule thus:
The amount of evidence . . . [to sustain such a charge] must be greater
than in the ordinary civil case, because he [the party so charged] ...
has placed more weight on his side of the scales; but the required degree
of preponderance is the same. The degree of conviction in the minds of
the jury may be the same where there is a charge of crime in a civil
case as where there is no such charge, though more evidence is necessary
to overcome opposing testimony and produce that conviction in the one
case than in the other. A preponderance in either case is sufficient.9 5
It is apparent that McBee, in requiring a preponderance over both
evidence and presumption, is actually requiring a higher degree of
certainty in this type of civil case; and this seems proper. Allegations
89. See Groom, Proof of Crime in a Civil Proceeding, 13 MnN. L. Rav. 556
(1929). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2498(2) (3d ed. 1940).
90. See Annots., 124 A.L.R. 1378 (1940); 62 A.L.R. 1449 (1929).
91. 10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 225 (1828).
92. Fleming v. Wallace, 116 Tenn. 20, 91 S.W. 47 (1905); McBee v. Bowman,
89 Tenn. 132, 14 S.W. 481 (1890); Hills v. Goodyear, 72 Tenn. 233 (1880).
93. Bennett v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 107 Tenn. 371, 64 S.W. 759
(1901) (fraud); City of Sparta v. Lewis, 91 Tenn. 370, 23 S.W. 182 (1892)
(action by municipality to recover penalty for violation of ordinance for

which there could also be criminal prosecution); Keys v. Keys, 23 Tenn. App.
188, 129 S.W.2d 1103 (E.S. 1939) (forgery of will); Fly v. Woods, 13 Tenn.
App. 310 (W.S. 1931) (fraud); Livingston v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 7
Tenn. App. 230 (M.S. 1928) (fraud); Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Knight, 2
Tenn. App. 259 (W.S. 1926) (fraud). See also GIBsoN's Suns IN CHANCERY §
453 (5th ed., Crownover 1955); Note, 10 VAND. L. REV. 563 (1957).
94. 122 Tenn. 433, 123 S.W. 746 (1909).
95. 89 Tenn. 132, 140, 14 S.W. 481, 483 (1890).
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of this nature are of such gravity that if a comparable situation arose
in everyday life, an impartial person confronted with the necessity of
making a decision would demand of himself a greater degree of certainty. No less can be demanded in a lawsuit. But it is submitted that
the Tennessee courts are in error in feeling that this higher requirement is conveyed to the mind of the fact finder by the language of
McBee. Looking strictly to the effect that language has on the mind,
it is difficult to see how the mere statement that a presumption is to
be considered as evidence can have any convincing power at all. If
the present practice of mentioning the presumption and charging in
terms of evidence must be followed, it would seem that to properly
impress upon the mind of the jury that the more stringent measure
is required, he should be told that this presumption must be overcome
by more than a preponderance of the evidence, or, in the vernacular
now in general use, that it must be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence.
Of course, the best solution in this as in other cases requiring a
higher measure of persuasion would be to abandon the use of such
language entirely since it wrongly focuses attention upon the evidence
rather than upon a state of mind, and tends to confuse the fact finder.
Further, it might be asked how can any evidence which is not clear
be convincing, and how can any evidence which is not convincing be
96
the basis of a verdict?
The Criminal Case
Although the method of proving particular facts is substantially the
same in both civil and criminal cases, 97 it is not at all surprising that
a much greater degree of certainty is required when the liberty or life
of a person is at stake, rather than merely his fortune. Consequently,
it is well accepted in Tennessee that in order to convict one criminally
accused all elements of the offense must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt.98
Of the three charges as to measure of persuasion now in general
96. See Morgan, Presumptions,10 RUTGERs L. REv. 512 (1956).
97. TENN. CODE Aw. § 40-2401 (1955).
98. Chadwick v. State, 189 Tenn. 256, 225 S.W.2d 52 (1949); Foster v. State,
180 Tenn. 164, 172 S.W.2d 1003 (1943); Caldwell v. State, 164 Tenn. 325, 48
S.W.2d 1087 (1931); Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W.2d 400 (1929);
Moon v. State, 146 Tenn. 319, 242 S.W. 39 (1921); Odeneal v. State, 128 Tenn.
60, 157 S.W. 419 (1913); Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327 (1910);
Frazier v. State, 117 Tenn. 430, 100 S.W. 94 (1906); State v. Moss, 106 Tenn.
359, 61 S.W. 87 (1901); King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 20 S.W. 169 (1892); Owen
v. State, 89 Tenn. 698, 16 S.W. 114 (1891); Barnards v. State, 88 Tenn. 183,
12 S.W. 431 (1889); Rea v. State, 76 Tenn. 356 (1881); Lawless v. State, 72
Tenn. 173 (1879); Butler v. State, 66 Tenn. 35 (1872); Poole & Mahaffey v.
State, 61 Tenn. 288 (1872); Dove v. State, 50 Tenn. 348 (1872); Purkey v.
State, 50 Tenn. 26 (1870); Phipps v. State, 43 Tenn. 344 (1866).
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use the criminal charge is by far the most meaningful to the average
juror. As the Supreme Court of Tennessee has said, "we question
whether, if the judge had attempted an explanation [of reasonable
doubt], he could have given a definition more easily comprehended
by the jury . . . -99 Nevertheless, Tennessee judges have at times
attempted to explain "reasonable doubt," with varying degrees of
success. Defining it as "an inability .. .to let the mind rest easily
upon the certainty of guilt or innocence" was approved in Rea v.
State,10 0 but held to be reversible error in State v. Moss' 01 because it
implied that the mind of the finder of fact should rest easily on the
certainty of the defendant's innocence before he could be acquitted.
A definition of reasonable doubt as that which "leaves your minds in
that condition that you do not feel an abiding conviction to a moral
certainty of the truth of the charge" has been upheld.10 2 It is submitted that such explanations tend to complicate what is otherwise a
relatively self-explanatory charge. Their effect on the mind of the
finder of fact is likely to be confusion, or increased incomprehension,
rather than enlightenment.
The terminology "beyond reasonable doubt" has not always met with
approval in Tennessee, as witness the language of Chief Justice Catron
in classifying the phrase as

[Ain awkward and vague expression, calculated to cover but too often
the corrupt verdict of a juror packed on the state by the defendant, and
what is almost as bad, calculated to ease the conscience of an honest but
weak hearted juror, who is convinced of the guilt of the defendant, yet is
willing to violate his oath to quiet his sympathy.
The chief justice then goes on to expound what he believes to be the
correct charge in criminal cases:
It is hoped it [beyond reasonable doubt] will be dropped by the circuit
courts, and the juries in its stead be told, that from all the evidence taken
together, and taken in connexion [sic] with the law as laid down by the
court, the jury must be honestly, and fairly, and impartially convinced,
that the defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment, before they can
give a verdict of guilty. 103
With all due deference to the learned chief justice, it may be questioned just how this charge will eliminate the problem caused by the
"packed" or "weak hearted juror." Rather, will not the requirement of
being convinced seem to the fair minded and impartial jurors to demand absolute certainty? Could such a juror conscientiously convict
under such a charge if even a possible doubt remained?
99. Butler v. State, 66 Tenn. 35, 37 (1872).
100. 76 Tenn. 356 (1881).
101. 106 Tenn. 359, 61 S.W. 87 (1901).
102. See Odeneal v. State, 128 Tenn. 60, 63, 157 S.W. 419, 420 (1913).
103. Coffee v. State, 11 Tenn. 283, 286 (1832).
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While opposition to the use of "beyond reasonable doubt" is not
usually so pronounced, it is reflected in many cases by the substitution
of other phraseology. When this occurs, it becomes necessary for the
appellate court to determine if such substitute phraseology imports an
equivalent meaning.
A charge that the proof must be "to your satisfaction" or "must
satisfy you" has been held to be reversible error, 1°4 but other charges
in terms of "full satisfaction" or "leaving the mind at rest" have been
upheld in the absence of a special request for a further charge,10 5 even
though many cases hold that the trial judge has a duty to charge in
terms of reasonable doubt without any request.10 6 The appellate courts
themselves have suggested the use of "full conviction" as the substan07
tial equivalent of beyond reasonable doubt.
It is difficult to see how requirements of satisfaction or conviction
add to the enlightenment of the jury, and perhaps the most that can
be said in favor of leaving the mind at rest is that while it does not
contribute to the jury's enlightenment, at least it will not increase its
incomprehension. Further, a charge calling for conviction or satisfaction can easily be interpreted as calling for absolute truth and should
be avoided for this reason.
If the guilt of the defendant depends wholly upon circumstantial
evidence, failure to charge with reference to such evidence is fundamental and reversible error, even though no request is tendered; 108
and, giving the charge as to reasonable doubt does not supersede the
necessity of charging that in order to authorize a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be such as to exclude
every reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant's guilt. 10 9
Although this concern with the probative value of circumstantial
evidence is found in a number of jurisdictions besides Tennessee," 0
there seems to be no valid reason for the perpetuation of such a rule
104. See Fisher v. State, 117 Tenn. 430, 100 S.W. 94 (1906); Owen v. State,
89 Tenn. 698, 16 S.W. 114 (1891).
105. See Dietzel v. State, 132 Tenn. 47, 177 S.W. 47 (1915); Barnards v.
State, 88 Tenn. 183, 12 S.W. 431 (1889); Turner v. State, 72 Tenn. 206 (1879);
Lawless v. State, 72 Tenn. 173 (1879); Purkey v. State, 50 Tenn. 26 (1870).
106. See e.g., Frazier v. State, 117 Tenn. 430, 100 S.W. 94 (1906).
107. See Dove v. State, 50 Tenn. 348 (1872); Coffee v. State, 11 Tenn. 283
(1832).

108. See Bishop v. State, 199 Tenn. 428, 287 S.W.2d 49 (1956); Green v.
State, 154 Tenn. 26, 285 S.W. 554 (1926); Webb v. State, 140 Tenn. 205, 203
S.W. 955 (1918); Turner v. State, 72 Tenn. 206 (1879).

109. Stinson v. State, 181 Tenn. 172, 180 S.W.2d 883 (1944); Dietzel v. State,
132 Tenn. 47, 177 S.W. 47 (1915); Barnards v. State, 88 Tenn. 183, 12 S.W. 431
(1889); Rea v. State, 76 Tenn. 356 (1881); Nelson v. State, 32 Tenn. (2 Swan)
237 (1852); Smith v. State, 2 Tenn. Leg. Rep. 56 (1878). That such charge
need not be made when direct evidence is also introduced, see Smith v. State,
159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W.2d 400 (1929) and Moon v. State, 146 Tenn. 319, 242
S.W. 39 (1921).

110. See Annot., 15 A.L.R. 1049 (1921).
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other than an inherent distrust of circumstantial evidence. A correct
charge as to reasonable doubt alone seems fully to protect the defendant and the addition to the charge required when circumstantial
evidence is in issue is redundant and unnecessary.
It is well established that beyond reasonable doubt is the degree of
belief necessary as to every element of the offense."' However, this
same degree of certainty is not necessary as to other aspects of the
proceedings. For instance, affirmance by the appellate court after
conviction requires only a preponderance of the evidence, since at that
point guilt is said to be presumed;" 2 the issue of venue is only jurisdictional and may be established by a preponderance of the evidence; n 3 and present (at time of trial) insanity has no bearing on
guilt or innocence and requires only a preponderance." 4 Of course
the defendant need not prove beyond reasonable doubt a defense introduced to negate an essential element of the state's case and it is
5
error for the judge to so charge."
The jury in a Tennessee criminal case is both the finder of fact and
the judge of the law." 6 To aid the jury in this task, the Tennessee Code
provides that in all felony cases the charge must be completely written
down, read to the jury, and then sent out with them upon their retirement." 7 The worth of such a provision is totally obviated if the
charge is so worded as to be incapable of comprehension. That part
of the charge dealing with the measure of persuasion especially must
be lucidly expressed, since it is there that the jury is most apt to
become confused." 8 When correctly used without modifications or
qualifications that tend to confuse and obscure the true meaning, the
phrase "beyond reasonable doubt" is an understandable expression of
the measure of persuasion required in criminal cases. However, to
better effect a uniform system of instructions, it is suggested that
111. See Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327 (1910); Frazier v.
State, 117 Tenn. 430, 100 S.W. 94 (1906); Owen v. State, 89 Tenn. 698, 16 S.W.
114 (1891); Dove v. State, 50 Tenn. 348 (1872).

112. See e.g., Cathey v. State, 191 Tenn. 617, 235 S.W.2d 601 (1950); Gang
v. State, 191 Tenn. 468, 234 S.W.2d 997 (1950); Robertson v. State, 189 Tenn.
42, 221 S.W.2d 535 (1949).
113. See e.g., Reynolds v. State, 199 Tenn. 349, 287 S.W.2d 15 (1956).
114. See e.g., Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327 (1910).
115. Legere v. State, 111 Tenn. 368, 77 S.W. 1059 (1903) (alibi); Hamilton
v. State, 97 Tenn. 452, 37 S.W. 194 (1896) (self-defense); King v. State, 91
Tenn. 617, 20 S.W. 169 (1892) (insanity); Wiley v. State, 64 Tenn. 662 (1875)
(alibi); Dove v. State, 50 Tenn. 348 (1872) (insanity); Chappel v. State, 47
Tenn. 92 (1869). See also Annot., 29 A.L.R. 1127 (1924) on alibi as a defense.
But see, Odeneal v. State, 128 Tenn. 60, 157 S.W. 419 (1913) (alibi must be
clearly and fully established).
116. TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 9. See Dykes v. State, 296 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn.

1956); Ford v. State, 101 Tenn. 454, 47 S.W. 703 (1898).
117. TENN. CODE AN. § 40-2516 (1955).
118. See note 15, supra.
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alterations be made so as to cause the criminal charge to conform more
closely to a correct statement of the civil charges.
CONCLUSION
The preceeding discussion emphasizes the need for, and the value
of, clear and understandable instructions.
The instruction is the means by which the body of the law is kept intact;
the means by which each man subject to trial is assured that on an equal
basis with all other men his rights will have applied to them the principles
forged out of centuries of legal development and found just. Without
the instruction no check rein would exist on the jury and every verdict
would be based on the layman juror's conclusion as to what the law
should be-or trial by mob. The time-tried formula for rendering justice
would be replaced by the layman's thirty minute conclusion as to what
the law, as influenced by his personal passion, prejudice and sympathy
ought to be.
The instruction is the only way, in jury trials, in which the rules of
law can be applied to the facts-it furnishes the tie that binds the particular facts in evidence irrevocably to the particular rule applicable. Without
this tie, ten companion cases would be subjected to ten different legal
interpretations by ten different juries.11 9
But no instruction can properly serve its function unless it is clear
and understandable. It has been demonstrated that the present Tennessee instructions as to measure of persuasion are not clear and
understandable thus giving rise to the necessity of employing other
expressions.
It is submitted that only an instruction phrased in terms of probabilities can be clear, understandable and accurate. This does not mean

that absolute truth is not the desired goal of a lawsuit but rather is a
pragmatic realization that such can never be attained under an adversary system of litigation. Therefore, when the evidence in a particular
case requires that a finding of fact be based upon that measure of
persuasion now termed a preponderance of the evidence, it is recom-

mended that the instructions should advise that the fact be found to
exist for the purposes of the lawsuit if its existence is more probable
than its non-existence. In the unusual civil case where the measure of
persuasion is now expressed as clear and convincing evidence, a fact
should be found to exist if its existence is much more probable or
more highly probable than its non-existence. In a criminal case, the

instruction now given, beyond reasonable doubt, correctly places emphasis upon the mental processes of the finder of fact and does seem to
evoke the requisite degree of belief. In the interest of uniformity,
however, this instruction could more properly be phrased "probability
119. Trusty, The Value of Clear Instructions, 15 KANS. Cy. L. REV. 9, 10

(1946).
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beyond a reasonable doubt, but not beyond a possible doubt." It can
be seen that by expressing the measure of persuasion in any case in
terms of probabilities the standard will be more understandable to the
layman since his own everyday decision making processes are in terms
of probabilities. Further, in this manner, increasing degrees of persuasion demanded in different types of cases are more vividly depicted
while at the same time uniformity is gained throughout each of the
standards. Finally and most important, by such phrases, the attention
of the fact finder will be correctly focused on his own state of mind,
rather than upon the evidence.
It is possible to reach the desired result of having the charge phrased
in terms of probabilities in only two ways - by judicial action or by
legislation. Isolated judicial opinions have shown a favorable disposition towards this concept, at least to some degree, 120 but no Tennessee decision can be found which has totally abandoned the well
accepted phrases and spoken only in terms of probabilities - nor is
one anticipated. Although legislation setting forth an instruction complete as to all elements with special emphasis on the measure of persuasion is a possible solution, 121 the problem, being somewhat academic
in nature, seemingly could best be treated within a small group intimately associated therewith and equipped to deal intelligently with
120. Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39 (1857) stated that a

civil claim must be established by proof sufficient to satisfy the mind of the
"probable truth" of the fact alleged. The use of "probable truth" seems
negatived by the qualifications of "establish" and "satisfy" which result in
a requirement of more certainty than would a balancing of probabilities.
Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85 (1939) stated that
it was sufficient in civil cases if the party having the burden of proof made
out the "more probable hypothesis." However, the tendency in subsequent
decisions has been to qualify this view by substituting "preponderance of
evidence" for "more probable hypothesis" and equating the two. See Law v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 179 Tenn. 687, 170 S.W.2d 360 (1943); Noe v. Talley,
38 Tenn. Anp. 342, 274 S.W.2d 367 (E.S. 1954); Finks v. Gillum, 38 Tenn. App.
304, 273 S.W.2d 722 (M.S. 1954); Yearwood v. Louisville & N. R.R., 32 Tenn.
App. 115, 222 S.W.2d 33 (M.S. 1949); Havron v. Sequachee Valley Elec.
Co-Op, 30 Tenn. App. 234, 204 S.W.2d 823 (en banc 1947); Tennessee Cent. Ry.
v. McCowan, 28 Tenn. App. 225, 188 S.W.2d 931 (M.S. 1945). This seems clearly
erroneous. A preponderance of evidence refers to an amount of evidence. A
probability on the other hand is a degree of belief. Evidence is that which
enables one to discern probabilities and is not the probability itself. An
occasional opinion closely approaches a correct phrasing in terms of probability. For example, see the opinion of Felts, J. in Good v. Tennessee Coach Co.,
30 Tenn. App. 575, 209 S.W.2d 41 (M.S. 1947) (the more probable hypothesis
should control).
121. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1096 (Deering 1949) is the only real attempt in this

country to provide by legislation the exact charge as to measure of persuasion

in a criminal case. Although this is an admirable undertaking, the actual
definition given is phrased in the meaningless terms of "abiding conviction to
a moral certainty." See also Palmer, Standardized Jury Instructions Succeed,
23 JOURNAL OF THE AMERIcAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 77 (1940), 20 FLA. L.J. 60
(1946). For proposed remedial statutes as to charges on the measure of
persuasion see McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV.
242 (1944).
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it. Fortunately, the framework for such a deliberative body is readily
22
available. The Tennessee Code provides for a Judicial Conference'
2
composed of judges of courts of record' 3 and the attorney general' 24
which is to meet annually 125 and has as one of its functions
the consideration of any and all matters pertaining to the discharge of
the official duties and obligations of its several members, to the end that
there shall be a more prompt and efficient administration of justice in
the courts of this state.126
Such a group is eminently qualified to weigh the merits and demerits
of these suggestions and implement any results reached directly into
the trial and appellate practice. It is strongly recommended that the

Judicial Conference take cognizance of and rectify this deficiency in
Tennessee procedure. For, as stated by Professor Morgan:
If we are to expect jurors to act with intelligence in weighing the evidence, certainly we should insist that the courts cease giving them instructions in language which cannot convey the intended meaning to them and
which frequently judges themselves do not understand. 127
KENNETH L. ROBERTS
WILLIAM M. Sn IcH
122. TENN. CODE ANNV. §§ 17-401
123. Id. § 401.

124. Id. § 402.
125. Id. § 404.
126. Ibid.

to -07 (1955).

127. Morgan, Presumptions,10 RUTGERS L. REV. 512, 522 (1956).

